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Abstract 
Over the past decade, several states have created comprehensive
accountability systems designed to increase student learning in public
schools. These accountability systems are based on "high-stakes"
standardized testing of a state curriculum. Rewards and interventions for
local educators are based largely upon students' performance on these
tests. Using the recent accountability reforms in Georgia as a backdrop,
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this article considers the role of local flexibility within such an
accountability system--flexibility over paperwork, resources, personnel,
and curriculum for local educators. Increased flexibility for local
educators is not merely an option in a world where local educators are
subject to a comprehensive accountability system imposed by a state--it
is a requirement for success. We make a case for providing local
flexibility and provides a discussion regarding types of flexibility,
vehicles for granting flexibility, and who should receive flexibility.
  
I. Introduction
 Over the past decade, several states have created comprehensive accountability
systems designed to increase student learning in public schools. These accountability
systems are based on "high-stakes" standardized testing of a state curriculum. Local
educators face consequences based on how well their students do on these exams. They
receive rewards for good student performance and are subject to interventions to rescue
children from low-performing schools. Using the recent accountability reforms in
Georgia as a backdrop, this article considers the role of local flexibility within an
accountability system--flexibility over paperwork, resources, personnel, and curriculum
for local educators.
 This increased flexibility involves a decentralization of authority that is broader
than, but inclusive of, school-based management. To implement the increased flexibility
for local educators contemplated in this article would require profound decreases in the
dizzying array of state and federal regulations governing local districts, schools, and
personnel.
 Increased flexibility for local educators is not merely an option in a world where
local educators are subject to a comprehensive accountability system imposed by a
state--it is a requirement for success. Failure to provide local educators with flexibility to
meet statewide learning goals for students would lead to blurred lines of accountability,
and would not capitalize on the unique talents of local educators and other unique local
circumstances, both of which would ultimately prevent accountability systems from
realizing their full potential. In addition, this failure will likely prevent accountability
systems from surviving the political battles that periodically surround public education.
This article makes a case for providing local flexibility within an accountability system
and provides a discussion regarding the granting of flexibility, types of flexibility,
vehicles for granting flexibility, and who should receive flexibility.
 To those ends, section II provides an overview of comprehensive accountability
systems that measure school and student performance and hold local educators
accountable for this performance. Section III describes the appropriate role for local
flexibility within such an accountability system. Types of local flexibility and vehicles
for granting this flexibility are presented in sections IV and V. Section VI discusses who
should get flexibility, including guiding principles for state policymakers. Section VII
contains concluding remarks.
II. Overview of Accountability
 Several states, including Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, and, most recently,
Georgia, have created comprehensive accountability systems designed to increase
3 of 24
student learning in public schools. A "comprehensive" accountability system has each of
the following three components:
Goals for student learning at all grade levels.1.
Accurate measurement of student learning outcomes.2.
Rewards for local educators (superintendents, principals and other administrators,
and teachers) for good student outcomes and interventions to rescue children 
from failing schools.
3.
 We served on the staff of the Governor's Education Reform Study Commission
(GERSC) that led to the creation of the comprehensive accountability system for
Georgia's public schools.1 At the first Commission meeting in June 1999, Georgia
Governor Roy E. Barnes announced the "charge" for GERSC:
Let us come to the table and pool our best ideas, let us bring our
best-hearted intentions, and let us steel up our best resolve to ensure for our
children tomorrow a better system of public education than we find today.
--Georgia Governor Roy E. Barnes2
 In his speech, Governor Barnes announced the formation of four committees, the
most ambitious of which was titled "Accountability."3 In describing the role of the
Accountability Committee, the Governor said he wanted an end to "excuse-based
education" in Georgia public schools. The committee members included business
executives, legislators from both major political parties, retired educators active in
education policy circles, and a retired college president (who is currently a professor).4
The Accountability Committee heard testimony from several local, regional, and
national researchers and professional educators about accountability approaches in other
states and important conceptual issues in designing an accountability system. Many of
the individuals who made presentations were veterans of the standards and
accountability movement and recommended comprehensive standardized testing on
public school students in several subjects.5 The committee members were told that these
exams should be curriculum-based exams called criterion-referenced tests, and these
exams could be used as an important measuring stick for evaluating the performance of
individual students, educators, schools, and districts. Using such exams for
accountability purposes is commonly known as "high stakes testing."
 Although the Accountability Committee made no formal recommendations, the
committee members coalesced around the following ideas:
Students in grades 3 and above should take curriculum-based exams at the end of
each school year, based on the state of Georgia's Quality Core Curriculum.
There should be threshold scores on these exams that indicate how well each
student has mastered the material.
Local districts, schools, and educators should be held accountable for how well
their students performed on these exams by a system of rewards for good
performance and interventions for persistently low levels of student learning.
These rewards and interventions should be based on levels of student learning and
improvements.
There should be a new, agency, independent of the state's Department of
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Education, created to monitor performance of the exams and other educational
outcomes and to administer rewards and interventions.
 House Bill 1187, passed by the Georgia General Assembly in the Spring of 2000
and signed into law by Governor Barnes set up a state accountability system for public
education in Georgia that closely followed the thinking of the members of the
Accountability Committee (Chapter 20 Section 14 of the Georgia Official Code).
 For the first time, Georgia had an accountability system based on the end product
of education--student learning. The state Department of Education, which prior to the
formation of the education commission had already begun refining the state curriculum
(QCC) and creating curriculum-based exams, would administer statewide exams to
students in grades 3 and above. These exams were first administered in some grades and
subjects in the Spring of 2000, and they will be fully implemented in all grades and
subjects by 2002. For both schools and educators, the law provides several rewards for
good performance and interventions for persistently low performance--performance
defined in terms of student learning of the state's curriculum and other, currently
unspecified, student outcomes. Rewards and interventions will be implemented once the
exams are fully implemented. The rewards and interventions passed under the new
accountability law include6: 1) Two grades (A through F) will be awarded to each
school, where one grade will based on levels of student learning outcomes and the other
grade will be based on improvements in student learning outcomes; 2) All certified
personnel at a school will be given a $1,000 bonus for each "A" grade the school
receives and a $500 bonus for each "B" grade.
 "If a school has received a grade of D or F for a period of two consecutive years or
more, the State Board of Education could appoint a school master or management team
to oversee and direct the duties of the principal of the school in relation to the school
until school performance improves and the school is released from intervention by the
director, with the cost of the master or management team to be paid by the state."7
 "If a school has received a grade of D or F for a period of three consecutive years
or more, the State Board of Education shall implement one or more of the following
interventions or sanctions, in order of severity:
(A) Removal of school personnel on recommendation of the master or the school
improvement team, including the principal and personnel whose performance has
continued not to produce student achievement gains over a three-year period as a
condition for continued receipt of state funds for administration
(B) Allow for the implementation of a state charter school through the designation
by the State Board of Education;
(C) Mandate the complete reconstitution of the school, removing all personnel,
appointing a new principal, and hiring all new staff. Existing staff may reapply for
employment at the newly reconstituted school but shall not be rehired if their
performance regarding student achievement has been negative for the past three
years;
(D) Mandate that the parents have the option to relocate the student to other public
schools in the local school system to be chosen by the parents of the student with
transportation costs borne by the system; or
(E) Mandate a monitor, master, or management team in the school that shall be
paid by the district."8
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 Although the newly created Office of Education Accountability (OEA),
independent of the state's Department of Education, has not yet determined what student
learning outcomes will determine these school-level grades that will drive the rewards
and interventions. Nevertheless, it is mandated in HB 1187 that student performance on
the curriculum-based exams, both levels of performance and improvements, will be the
main determinant of each school's grades.
 The cash bonuses to teachers and the potential interventions, especially public
school choice and opening a state-funded charter school in the neighborhood of a failing
school are not widespread across the U.S.9
 Although the issues involved are extremely important, our purpose here is not to
discuss the merits or demerits of accountability systems based on high stakes testing and
state mandated rewards and interventions.10 This article considers the appropriate role
of local flexibility within a comprehensive accountability system and several
implementation issues, including what kind of flexibility to grant, how to grant it, and to
whom should flexibility be granted.
III. Flexibility Within An Accountability System
 In this section, a case is made for providing local educators and schools with
flexibility--if and only if the local educators are held accountable for their performance
by an outside entity.11 At the end of this section, we discuss the issues of negative
unintended consequences that may be present in systems of comprehensive
accountability and governance in a decentralized system.
 The argument for flexibility under a system of accountability has been made
before (Hanushek, 1994; Hannaway, 1996). We reiterate their claims and discuss
implementation and political economy concerns as well.
 Comprehensive accountability means three things: goals for student learning,
student learning outcomes are accurately measured, and local educators (school boards,
superintendents, principals and other administrators, and teachers) are subject to rewards
for good student outcomes and interventions to rescue children from failing schools. If
truly held accountable for student learning outcomes, local educators have strong 
incentives to do whatever it takes to achieve the specified student learning goals.
 Without a significant degree of control over the means for education
improvement, such as budgets, personnel, and curriculum, local educators cannot
ultimately be held accountable for achieving the assigned end of improving and
achieving a high level of student learning. This point is best demonstrated by
considering two polar opposite forms of "accountability."
Accountability over Inputs, Process, and Program Implementation
 Suppose the state were to give each school student learning targets and a
prescription for how to achieve those targets. If a particular school obediently
implemented the state's prescription and the level of student learning was low and was
not improving, then this failure belongs to the state--not the school. This school would
be responsible for properly implementing the state's prescription; the school would not
be ultimately responsible for student learning. Local educators, who possess better
information about their own unique talents and the local circumstances, including the
types of students, resources, and environment, may wish to deviate from the centrally
prescribed education formula because they deem such changes as beneficial in their local
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situation. Local educators who acted on those wishes would be subject to sanctions for
not following the script they were given.
 This approach to "accountability" makes state policymakers responsible for
student learning outcomes and local educators responsible for implementing the state's
prescription. This blurs the lines of accountability, because lawmakers, parents, and
other citizens will inevitably blame local educators for any low performance by students.
In addition, the unique talents of local educators and circumstances of local schools are
not exploited to best achieve the state's goals. Taken together, these two problems will
frustrate local educators and could lead to poor implementation of state education policy,
higher teacher and administrator attrition, and even a reversal of state education policy
regarding standards and accountability as local educators make credible arguments that
state policy inhibits local creativity and misplaces blame for any failures.
(Results-Based) Comprehensive Accountability
 A second approach is to have state and local education authorities articulate the
desired standards for student achievement and hold schools and educators accountable,
through rewards and interventions, for meeting or failing to meet the standards.
Choosing the second path, the path of accountability for student learning and flexibility
on "how to" meet the goals, local educators are encouraged and empowered to pursue
their own paths for success, and, thus, they would be ultimately responsible for the
results of their own initiative.
 The purpose of flexibility within a results-based accountability system is to allow
educators and schools to create their own roadmaps for educational success given their
unique student populations, circumstances, and personnel. Although local school
systems, schools, administrators, and teachers across the nation have varying degrees of
flexibility, even when there is little or no local accountability, the level of flexibility that
is desirable under a results-based accountability system is much larger than that which is
desirable under the typical notion of "accountability"--accountability over on inputs,
process, and program implementation.12
 School-based management plans (flexibility plans) implemented in various states
across the nation do not typically provide much local flexibility, and there is not any
evidence that school-based management alone leads to better student outcomes
(Summers and Johnson, 1996). In fact, an Education Commission of the States report
cites a RAND study that concluded that no school-based management effort "has yet
created the hoped-for dramatic improvements in school quality (Education Commission
of the States, 2000)."
 State policymakers in Georgia, and in other states as well, are reluctant to give
local educators more autonomy. This reluctance is understandable given the lack of true
accountability in most states. In a world without results-based accountability, many
education rules and regulations are absolutely necessary: Relative to a world with no
accountability over process or results, such rules and regulations promote good student
outcomes. The goal of rules and regulations is to elicit good school performance,
students learning beyond expectations. However, most local educators believe that many
of the current laws and rules, through unintended consequences, hinder them from
offering the best possible education to each child. However, eliminating such rules is not
necessarily warranted--local educators have little incentive to act in the best interest of
children without the rules if they are not held accountable for student outcomes--it is
human nature. This is not a characteristic of educators, but one of humans in general.13
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 If given autonomy, what incentive does a local educator have to pursue whatever
it takes to make sure that students achieve if they are not held accountable for student
learning outcomes? If given autonomy over hiring decisions, what is to stop a principal
from hiring a relative or friend who may not be competent as a teacher? Nothing unless
there are certification rules and other regulations to drastically mitigate the chance of
this occurring. (Of course, no set of rules can completely eliminate all corruption or
well-intentioned, but misguided, policies). However, these rules limit the principals'
flexibility over who he or she can hire to teach. These rules are desirable if the principal
is not held responsible for student learning outcomes. If principals are held responsible,
such rules may not be necessary, and may even harm student learning by denying some
good teachers the ability to teach in our public schools.
 Given the reluctance of state lawmakers and officials to grant local flexibility,
local educators, who desire more flexibility over resources, personnel, and curriculum,
because they believe that their students will benefit from doing things in different ways,
will have to accept results-based comprehensive accountability (student learning goals,
measurement of progress toward the goals, and rewards for success and interventions to
rescue children from persistent failure) in exchange for the increased flexibility. But
there is another side to that coin: State policymakers who wish to impose results-based
comprehensive accountability systems on local educators may have to grant increased
flexibility to see their accountability reforms realize their full potential and to make their
accountability reforms "stick" politically. Failure to judiciously increase flexibility may
lead to a gradual erosion of accountability measures. If local educators who have little or
no flexibility to improve schools are blamed for any school failures, then such a situation
is not likely to be politically tenable. Those wrongly blamed will make the arguments
that they are held responsible for things beyond their control, and the end result could be
the erosion of accountability based on student learning--and any benefits that would
come from such an incentive system.
 There are opportunities for obtaining flexibility available to local schools under
current Georgia laws and regulations, and, by and large, local educators are not taking
advantage of them. These opportunities include the waiver process, charter school
conversions, and demonstration schools. Although there are many waiver petitions to the
state's Department of Education to gain relief from state regulations, the vast majority of
them are for the same two or three things (e.g. block scheduling). Charter school
conversion opportunities have been available since 1993, and there have been less than
30 conversions (out of 1,887 schools). The similar demonstration school process has
been available since the mid-1980s, and, to our knowledge, there has been only one
application. Georgia has recently begun implementation of a results-based accountability
system, and this new era will likely result in a large increase in the interest of local
educators in utilizing the existing flexibility to do things in different ways--because they
are now held accountable for student learning. If local educators under a system of
accountability do not wish to increase their autonomy over resources, personnel, and
curriculum, then we suspect that the rewards for good performance and/or the
consequences for failure are not providing strong incentives or motivation. That is, the
accountability system would not be comprehensive because it does not contain adequate
rewards and interventions.
Negative Unintended Consequences and Increased Local Flexibility
 Many education policymakers and researchers have expressed concerns about
negative unintended consequences that may result from inaccurate measurement of
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student and school performance--which may cause schools with low and high average
student performance from being incorrectly sanctioned or rewarded; measuring only
some student outcomes--which will likely lead to too much emphasis on what is easily
measurable; and incentives--which may distort educators' efforts in unintended,
undesirable ways, such as a decline in collegiality which decreases inter-teacher
professional development. Hannaway (1996) suggests that parents, the actors in a child's
education closest to the situation, can be empowered, via decentralization, to act as
monitors of the education process to minimize the harm caused by any negative
unintended consequences of incentives and flexibility (decentralization). Through local
(individual) school councils or via some form of parental school choice, parents will be
empowered to make their voices heard regarding the actions of individual schools.
Under its 2000 accountability reforms, Georgia created local school councils composed
of two parents, two "businesspeople," two teachers, and the school principal--the
majority is non-school employees. Legally, these school councils have almost no power,
but it will be interesting to see the impact of their mere existence on school and
district-level decision-making.14
Governance
 Under regimes of centralized decision-making in public education, citizens exert
their influence by electing school board members and/or federal, state, and local
lawmakers who in turn make decisions regarding school policy. Providing increased
autonomy to un-elected local educators would disenfranchise parents and other citizens
from a large degree of the education policymaking process. Therefore, it is likely that
any increase in decentralized authority would not survive politically if parents and other
taxpayers did not have some mechanism of exercising their political rights over their
children's schools, or the schools they finance. As stated above, two ways to implement
this mechanism include local school councils and enhanced school choice. Given this
line of reasoning, one may include "parents and other citizens" in the list of local
educators who receive increased autonomy under increased local flexibility. This issue is
not necessarily one of giving parents and other citizens more direct decision-making 
authority; the issue is at what level do the citizens' representatives make education policy
decisions.15
Issues for State and Federal Policymakers
 The first issue facing policymakers is whether there is a comprehensive
accountability system that is solid enough to contemplated large increases in local
flexibility. If yes, then the second issue is whether existing, perhaps largely unused,
flexibility under current laws and regulations is enough to empower local educators to
make whatever changes are necessary to increase student learning, which makes local
educators ultimately responsible for student learning. A third issue is whether parents
and other citizens are empowered to participate in education decision-making and to
monitor their local schools to minimize the harm caused by any negative unintended
consequences. This next section discusses areas in which states may consider granting
increased flexibility to local educators.
IV. Types of Flexibility
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 Under a comprehensive accountability system focused on student learning
outcomes, state and federal laws and/or regulations can be repealed to provide local
educators with flexibility over four broad areas: Reporting Requirements; Financial
Resources; Human Resources; Curriculum. We briefly discuss decentralizing authority
in order to increase local flexibility over these four areas, and then we list specific
examples of increased flexibility that could be granted to local educators, where these
examples come from the flexibility offered to public schools that currently operate under
a high degree of accountability: charter schools.
Reporting Requirements
 Local educators, in both district offices and individual schools, must complete a
lot of reports for both the state and federal governments. This paperwork is typically in
the form of reports that must be completed before and after the receipt of funds from
federal and state education programs. The pre-funding reports are typically plans on how
the particular pot of money would be spent, and the post-funding reports tend to be
assessments of how successful the particular program was at implementing the
program--the program's effect on student learning is all too often amorphous or
nonexistent in post-funding reporting. Thus, the purpose of this oversight is to ensure
that the money is spent in ways the state or federal government deems best for the
students. Under the new comprehensive accountability system in Georgia, the Office of
Education accountability will conduct results-based assessments. These will be formal
assessments and performance measurements for student learning such as standardized
curriculum-based exams. Given that these assessments directly measure--student
outcomes--what the current oversight measure indirectly, much of the current reporting
requirements may be superfluous.
 Filling out paperwork is arduous for local schools and systems, especially for
smaller school systems. One associate superintendent of a small school district who we
spoke with said that he spends about 30% of his time on filling out reports--time that he
feels could be better spent on instructional and programmatic improvements. In addition,
the time and resources previously devoted to filling out and monitoring paperwork could
be used to train local educators to be better managers of their increased flexibility.16
 Reduced paperwork has practical flexibility benefits as well. For example, some
school districts have directors of technology. These directors must fill out a lot of
paperwork on how state technology monies are spent. Any time these directors spend
filling out paperwork is time not spent training teachers how to use the technology.
 We list two alternative ways for the state to reduce reporting requirements on local
educators:
Have state education departments satisfy much of the reporting requirements
imposed by the federal government; under accountability reporting requirements,
state departments of education have the information necessary to fill out much of
this paperwork. If the state assumed this reporting burden, local educators--the
educators closest to the students--would have more time to focus on teaching and
learning.
1.
Give local schools systems and schools more flexibility over financial resources.
Having flexibility over financial resources would allow local educators to spend
less time reporting (to the state) how each dollar is spent.
2.
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Financial Resources
 Many public school districts receive monies from states through foundation grants
and categorical grants. Individual public schools, in turn, receive monies from school
systems. Superintendents and principals could be empowered to spend more state
monies in the ways they deem most appropriate to best educate their unique student
populations. In addition, any state regulations, explicit or implicit, of local money could
be repealed as well. The purpose of flexibility over financial resources is to empower
those closest to the children to try new things, to augment existing programs that are
working, and reduce or eliminate programs that are not working for their particular
students (such programs may work in other places for idiosyncratic reasons). A
by-product of this flexibility would be to reduce paperwork for system and school
administrators and teachers, which would allow them to spend more time focusing on
doing whatever it takes to improve their schools.
 A good way to demonstrate flexibility over financial resources is through an
extended example. Individual school districts in Georgia typically get English to
Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) dollars from the state. Many small school districts
have only a small number of ESOL students, so the state money they receive for the
ESOL program does not cover a full teacher's salary. School districts that have such
scale issues must use locally generated funds or other state funds for personnel to pay the
balance of an ESOL teacher's salary. In addition, the district would have to use local
funds for ESOL materials. Authority to use other state funds to purchase ESOL materials
would free up the local money for other programs that local educators deem most
important given their particular student populations, faculty, staff, and environment.
 Where would "other state funds" come from? Wouldn't those other state funds be
better spent on the programs for which they were earmarked by the state? Perhaps, but
consider an additional scenario. School districts in Georgia often receive money from
the state based on the system's "needs," needs as determined by the state, and these needs
tend to be drive by overall FTE counts and FTE counts for various student sub-groups
that are calculated to the hundredth decimal place. For example, a system may receive
state funding for 2.35 guidance counselors. Per state regulations, the system that
received funding for 2.35 guidance counselors must hire two guidance counselors.
Under Georgia law, the remaining 35% of a guidance counselor must be spent on
guidance counselors or direct teaching personnel, or else the money reverts back to the
state. That is, the local system must use all that state money for guidance counselors or
direct teaching personnel or lose it. Allowing local schools and systems to use the
guidance counselor money for guidance counselors or direct teaching personnel is an
example of flexibility over resources available under current laws and regulations.
However, there could be increased flexibility over that state taxpayer money. Suppose
local educators believe that because of their superior guidance counselors or students (of
for any other idiosyncratic reason) that the money that was originally intended to hire
35% of a guidance counselor does not need to be spent on guidance counseling or direct
teaching personnel. Suppose the school system would rather use those state funds for a
competing, albeit worthy, program. Suppose the school system wants to use those funds
for ESOL materials. Under current Georgia law, this money must be spent on hiring a
third guidance counselor or part of a teacher, and this requirement may not lead to the
highest and best use of those funds.
 Another good example is maximum class size restrictions.17 Without a
comprehensive accountability system, such class size restrictions may be necessary to
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ensure that the state money is spent wisely. However, under incentives from a
comprehensive accountability system, can states trust local educators to spend that
money wisely? Are smaller classes always the best use of those funds?
 Alternatives to give local educators flexibility over financial resources include
having fewer state programs and give the monies formerly earmarked for programs to
local schools on a foundation basis, and allowing local educators to spend monies
earmarked for less than 50% of a position in any ways they deem necessary.
Human Resources
 Regarding what types of individuals may be hired for some tasks and how much
individuals are paid, systems and individual schools in Georgia are bound by three major
state laws: teacher certification, "fair dismissal" (tenure), and the salary schedule.
 The purpose of certification is to ensure that only individuals of a sufficient
competency are permitted to be teachers. Under certification laws and regulations,
sufficient competency of potential teachers is determined centrally, not by local systems
and schools. This is in contrast to higher education and private K-12 education where
potential teachers are evaluated by individual schools and departments within schools.
An unintended consequence of certification requirements is that some prospective
teachers feel that they face too large of a barrier to offering their services to schools.
How many prospective educators are deterred is unknown.
 Individual schools and systems could be granted flexibility over who is permitted
to teach. The elimination of certification requirements, including alternative certification
requirements, would open the doors to teaching to individuals who are not willing to go
through the process of obtaining certification. For example, programs such as Teach for
America carefully screen recent college graduates and place them as teachers in schools.
These new college graduates typically did not study education, and many of them wish
to teach for only a short period of time. Local systems and schools could be empowered
to decide for themselves if they wish to screen new college graduates, older folks
looking for second careers, or others who are not certified to see if any or many of them
would make good teachers. Thus, the issue is not one of teaching quality; it is a question
of who decides whether an individual is competent to teach. In addition, states could
recruit and screen exceptional college graduates who did not study education as
undergraduates and any others interested and market these potential teachers to local
systems and schools. Such a state program would provide local educators with flexibility
by expanding the pool of possible teachers.18
 Flexibility over "fair dismissal" (tenure) provisions could be granted to local
schools or school systems--individual school systems or schools could be granted the
authority to design their own "fair dismissal" policies. Held accountable for results,
individual systems and schools would have the incentive to create fair dismissal policies
that allow them to maximize student learning. Georgia decentralized its statewide tenure
provisions, by severely weakening them, as part of its 2000 education reform law. Only
the Clayton County school district, so far, has created its own tenure provisions that
provide more protections than the new state law. Nevertheless, these provisions are
weaker than the previous state fair dismissal protections (Sansbury, 2000).
 Many southern states have a minimum teacher salary schedule that is based on
years of service and training. Elimination of a state-mandated salary schedule for
teachers would allow individual schools or systems to decide whether they want to pay
less to some teachers so that they may pay more to teachers they deem as important
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contributors to the overall mission of the school. Used judiciously, such policies could
help schools retain good teachers, and provide incentives for bad teachers to find
something else to do. An additional form of flexibility would be to allow for schools to
lure teachers by offering to start them at a higher step on the schedule than their years of
service and training would dictate. This flexibility would allow schools to pay more to
better teachers, which may enhance retention of these superior teachers.
Curriculum
 In the new standardized testing in Georgia, students will take exams designed to
test Georgia's Quality Core Curriculum (QCC). The QCC is designed to be the minimum
amount that students should learn in the various grade levels and subjects. Local
educators could remain free to augment the QCC in new and creative ways. Of course,
mandating statewide curriculum-based testing severely restricts local educators'
autonomy over curricular decisions. Therefore, states are responsible for the quality of
the curriculum, and, under flexibility, local educators are responsible for whether
students' master the curriculum.
What specific flexibility ought to be granted?
 One level of flexibility is the current level of state and federal regulation applied
to private schools, which is minimal. A less extreme level of local flexibility is the
flexibility requested or the flexibility actually granted to "traditional" and "conversion"
charter schools. Traditional charter schools that are public schools that are not
neighborhood public schools; traditional charter schools are schools of choice.
Traditional charter schools face a stronger set of incentives than other public schools;
two outside actors hold them accountable for results, a central authority and parents.
Traditional charter schools are, in theory, able to gain a large degree of autonomy in
exchange for the possibility of a death sentence--if the charter school does not meet
performance goals specified in their charter, a local school district or a state may revoke
the charter, which means the school closes. In addition, traditional charter schools are
held accountable by parents who may or may not decide to enroll their child in the
charter school. Where traditional charter schools exist, parents have the option of
sending their child to their neighborhood public school or the charter school. Typically,
before central authorities have closed failing charter schools, there have been dramatic
drops in student enrollments at these schools.
 Given these strong incentives to provide a high quality education to its students,
traditional charter schools have the incentive to seek to free itself from any rules and
regulations that hinder teaching and learning. Therefore, any state or federal entity that
seeks to identify any rules and regulations that may hinder teaching and learning in
neighborhood public schools should look to rules and regulations that charter schools
seek to escape, and the rules they actually escape.
 Conversion charter schools are neighborhood public schools that have received
increased flexibility from the state. These schools are different than traditional charter
schools in that they are not schools of choice. According to officials in the Georgia
Department of Education, conversion charter schools ask for, and receive, far less local
autonomy than traditional charter schools. Conversions have maintained most of their
previous organizational structure and curricular goals, but asked to be exempt from such
things as report cards regulations, how they handled certain categorical funds, and when
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they tested their students. It is likely that these schools could not obtain even more
flexibility, and do not seek to do so, because they are not schools of choice. That is, they
do not operate under the strong accountability faced by traditional charter schools.
Perhaps the change in school governance in Georgia via school councils will provide the
accountability and citizen authority necessary for conversion charter schools to ask for
and receive increased flexibility.
 For the research reported here, we interviewed several individuals about their
experiences with flexibility and the flexibility given to charter schools:
Beverly Shrenger, Coordinator, Georgia Charter Schools, Georgia Department of
Education;
Deborah McGriff, Edison Schools, Inc.;
Rich O'Neill, Edison Schools, Inc.;
Greg Giornelli, Principal, Drew Elementary School, a traditional charter school in
Atlanta, GA;
Regina Merriweather, Principal, Druid Hills High School, a conversion charter
school in DeKalb County, GA;
Jeffrey Williams, Georgia School Superintendent's Association;
Paul Hill, University of Washington, RAND Corporation.
 Based on telephone interviews, we compiled a list of rules of regulations that
charters typically seek to avoid. Any central authority considering whether to abolish
rules and regulations facing local educators should look to the relief given to charter
schools because, under comprehensive accountability for results, all neighborhood
public schools will have at least one important characteristic of charter
schools--responsibility for student outcomes and consequences based on those
outcomes.
Salary Schedules. Many charters want relief from salary schedules in order to have
the capability to pay what Edison Schools, Inc. refers to as "comparable and
competitive" salaries. These salaries are made up of an hourly rate, a yearly
percentage increase, incentives and bonuses, and stock options.
1.
Curriculum. Schools want the ability to develop the criteria for their own lesson
plans. Some charters use such prescribed curriculums as Core Knowledge while
others are totally innovative and use curriculums particular to that school. For
example, Edison schools prefers to use its own curriculum for at least 70% of
class times, and the state or district can dictate the remaining 30%.
2.
Non-Categorical Use of Funds. Traditional charters typically receive complete
freedom over their budget allocations at the school site. Conversion schools
typically ask for only limited flexibility or one-time flexibility. For example,
conversion charter schools may ask to use some funds ear-marked for
extra-curricular activities to buy technology.
3.
External Reporting. The type and amount of process reporting to chartering
agencies, school boards, and the Georgia State Department of Education is often
less than what is required of traditional public schools.
4.
Grading. Many charter schools want to have the ability to deviate from traditional
grading scales. Druid Hills Charter, a conversion, changed its grading scale so that
the letter grade "D" was inclusive of the 60th to 69th percentile. Some schools 
want to implement a policy of no grading, checklist reports, or even rely strictly
on portfolio's to show students achievement.
5.
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Seat Time and Scheduling. Charters have asked to be exempt from the states
requirement of 150 hours of clock time per year. Edison Schools have a longer
school year than most public schools, while some charters opt for longer school
days. This coincides with the request to alter the daily schedule for students (i.e.
block schedule) that require different time configurations than most districts
currently operate under.
6.
Textbooks. Since many charters wish to fully implement their school design, they
request the ability to choose textbooks that may or may not be approved by the
local school board.
7.
Certification. Teacher certification has not been a large issue for many charters
thus far, as most charters have hired primarily certified teachers. Charters do
exercise their ability to hire non-certified teachers in hard to fill subjects such as
math, science, and world language. Additionally, some charters allow teachers
certified for grades k-3 to teach 4th grade, for example.
8.
Promotion and Retention. Charters want the opportunity to choose which students
are promoted and retained each school year. Charters feel that this exemption is
imperative if they are going to be held accountable for each student's eventual
success or failure.
9.
Assessment instruments. Some charter schools like to perform their own
assessments, and request waivers from assessments, such as norm referenced
testing, that are notused for accountability purposes.
10.
Technology. Charter schools like to use technology in a way that is consistent with
their instructional goals. According to the U.S. Department of Education, 96% of
charter school classrooms nationwide were equipped with computers. However,
charters like the capability of choosing their own software, the amount of time
each student uses a computer and the ability to buy computers with multi-media
capabilities.
11.
Service Providers. Charter schools are typically allowed to choose what
non-educational (maintenance, janitorial, insurance, purchasing, legal, health,
social, before/after school, transportation, athletic, etc.) services are offered and
who will be the provider of those services. More than two thirds of charter schools
nationally either provided the service themselves or used outside providers.
12.
 Suppose a state government decides to provide local educators with flexibility
over at least some of these areas. This local flexibility raises a governance issues
regarding consent of the governed. Parents and other citizens, through their influence on
the political process, may permit schools of choice more latitude over their resources,
personnel, and curriculum because no parents are forced to send their children there.
Since traditional charter schools are schools of choice, all parents who choose one for
their children have revealed they support what the school is doing differently than the
neighborhood public school. This argument would suggest that flexibility given to
conversion charter schools is the appropriate amount of flexibility to provide, in
exchange for accountability. However, under Georgia's new accountability law,
individual school councils were created. Although these councils do not currently have
much authority, they would surely be megaphones for parents' and other citizens' voices
to be heard in school-level discussions of how to best use any increased flexibility.
Therefore, under the stronger consequences facing local educators under Georgia's new
accountability reforms and the presence of the local school councils, the wider latitude
given to traditional charter schools is possible for neighborhood public schools. Another
mechanism to solve the governance problem would be some form of public school
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choice.
V. What are the vehicle(s) for granting flexibility?
 Once a state, or federal, government decides to grant increased local flexibility
because of heightened accountability for local educators, how can it complete that task?
Alternative vehicles for granting flexibility include:
An entity that analyzes each and every state, or federal, rule and regulation and
decides which ones are not needed, and which ones may be abolished without
changing a law. This entity would be analogous to then Vice-President Gore's
National Performance Review that was created in 1993. This new entity, or a
piece of an existing entity, could be charged with analyzing each and every state
(federal) regulation of local systems and schools. Regulations deemed to be
impediments to teaching and learning would be eliminated by the entity.
1.
A legislature and executive could analyze each and every state law and decide
which are no longer needed under a comprehensive accountability system. Only
the legislature and executive can change existing state (federal) laws. The
legislature could devote some portion of a legislative term to reviewing existing
laws regarding education and deciding which laws are antiquated given an
environment of results-based accountability. Perhaps a one-time bipartisan
committee could be formed to begin the task. This vehicle for granting flexibility
was used in Texas and Florida.19
2.
A permanent entity that has the sole responsibility of hearing petitions from
individual schools and decides whether to grant a large degree of autonomy to
individual schools in exchange for a promise of increased student learning beyond
normal expectations. This is similar to the Georgia waiver process. The difference
is that flexibility will be granted for a whole range of items at one time, in
exchange for tangible, measurable promises of increased student learning. A
permanent new entity, or piece of an existing entity, whose sole mission is to hear
petitions from local systems and schools for large degrees of flexibility in
exchange for accountability would provide a permanent vehicle for enhancing
flexibility and accountability. Creating an entity that has hearing these petitions as
its sole mission would expedite the waiver process, and one of its goals would be
to become less arduous than the current waiver process. Agreements between this
entity and individual schools or systems would be akin to performance contracts.
Failure by the local educators to live up to the increases in student learning
specified in the agreement could result in the loss of the flexibility. Any
significant regression in student learning after receiving the new flexibility could
result in a state-mandated intervention, which would mean less local autonomy
than was initially present.
3.
VI. Who Gets Flexibility?
 Under comprehensive accountability based on student learning (results), flexibility
could be granted in three ways: as a feasible alternative, in a world of accountability
based on results, to empower all local principals and teachers find their own roadmaps
for success given their unique student populations, circumstances, and personnel; as a
reward to a school or system for high levels and/or improvement in student learning; as
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an opportunity to low performing schools to improve.
 Thus, differing degrees of flexibility may be granted all schools, only schools that
demonstrate a high level of performance, and/or only schools that demonstrate a low
level of performance. Texas, for example, dramatically reduced the regulations that the
Texas Education Agency imposed on local systems and schools. After the passage of
their accountability law in 1993, the Texas House and Senate Education Committees
met jointly to eliminate all state laws and policies that addressed "how" local educators
should provide schooling to children. At that time, the chairs of each committee were
from different political parties, and the "scrubbing" of their state laws and policies went
very well and was bipartisan. The flexibility law that subsequently passed stated that
local systems had to abide by the accountability code and the funding code. The law also
contained specific language to prevent the Texas Education Agency from making any
policies that did not pertain to the accountability or funding portions of the Texas state
code. The relationship between the state and local school systems in Texas is one of "if
it is not in the accountability or funding code, then you can do it. No questions asked."
Examples of regulations that were eliminated in Texas include: the length of the school
day and year, seat time for specific subjects, and the minimum required number of
library books per pupil.
 Texas has not yet been able to document to what extent the increase in flexibility
led to its recent increases in student achievement. (We obtained all information about
Texas from a phone interview with Dr. Criss Cloudt, Associate Commissioner, Office of
Policy, Planning, and Research, Texas Education Agency. Dr. Cloudt made a
presentation to GERSC 1999.)
 Schools who demonstrate a high level of performance and/or improvement have
demonstrated that they have "what it takes" to manage a school under the current rules
and regulations. Such successful leadership could be entrusted with even greater
flexibility, to see if they could increase school performance even higher. However, one
could argue, "Why rock the boat?" if the school is already high performing. We want to
"rock the boat" because we suspect that added flexibility, under accountability, will
allow high achieving schools to do even better. Texas provides additional flexibility to
schools that receive an "exemplary" rating from the state.
 Schools whose students are persistently low performing may credibly suggest that
state laws and regulations are due part of the blame for this low performance. Some
suggest that these schools should be given added flexibility, above what is given to other
schools, in order to see if they can improve. Others argue that giving these schools added
flexibility would reward failure.
Guiding Principles of Granting Flexibility
 Based on the arguments made here, we offer three guiding principles for any state
or federal policymakers deciding whether to grant flexibility to local schools, systems,
and educators:
Keep your eyes on the prize. The purpose of flexibility is to allow educators to
better organize their systems, schools, and personnel in order to increase student
learning.
1.
Trust but verify. Flexibility should only be granted in exchange for accountability,
a promise that student learning would increase beyond normal expectations.
Failure to meet the terms of the promise should result in loss of flexibility. If
under the flexibility, student learning in the school significantly regresses, the
2.
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school should receive help, which would leave the school with less flexibility than
it had initially. Under this principle, flexibility could be given to all schools,
including low performers.
Remove existing barriers to creativity that strives for excellence. Any system or
school that wants to improve should be allowed to try, in exchange for
accountability for results.
3.
VII. Conclusion
 With the passage of HB 1187 in the year 2000, Georgia's educational system has
entered a new era of comprehensive accountability--results-based accountability. The
state will set expectations and measure student learning outcomes; systems, schools, and
local educators will be rewarded for exceeding the standards; and the state will intervene
to rescue children from schools that are persistently falling below the standards. Given
the movement toward comprehensive, results-based, accountability systems in several
states, it is time to revisit the issue of decentralization in public education. Education
researchers and policymakers should carefully consider the issue of decentralization
within such accountability systems. To the extent that the rewards for success and
interventions to rescue children from low performing schools prove to be significant in
state accountability systems, local educators, in these states and in other states
implementing similar incentives, should be given increased flexibility over paperwork,
resources, personnel, and curriculum.
 The purpose of flexibility within a results-based accountability system is to allow
educators and schools to create their own roadmaps for educational success given their
unique student populations, circumstances, and personnel. The level of flexibility that is
desirable under a results-based accountability system is much larger than that which is
desirable under the typical way of doing things, which in Georgia pre Y2K reforms
meant accountability based on inputs, process, and program implementation. Within a
results-based accountability system educators and schools have strong incentives to do
whatever it takes to achieve the specified student learning goals.
 Any increase in flexibility is only possible because of the new era of
accountability. The more that systems, schools, and personnel are rewarded for
successes and subject to interventions for any failures, the more flexibility that may be
granted to local educators. The combination of empowerment through local flexibility
and consequences through rewards and interventions would give local educators the
motivation and incentives to do whatever it takes to make sure the students in their care
succeed.
 State-imposed comprehensive accountability systems are dramatic increases in
state regulation of curriculum and assessment coupled with incentives for increased
student learning. By themselves, these new state regulations may lead to better student
outcomes, just as many centrally imposed regulations perhaps lead to better
outcomes--in the absence of accountability based on student outcomes. Nevertheless,
without increased flexibility for local educators--flexibility over paperwork, resources,
and personnel--these standards and accountability reforms will not achieve their full
potential because they fail to capitalize on the initiative and industry of local educators
and they better information they have about unique local talents and circumstances. In
addition, failure to empower local educators while holding them ultimately responsible
for student learning outcomes will lead to an exodus from public education among local
educators at best and political pressure from within to emasculate accountability
reforms. For these reasons, we recommend large increases in autonomy for local
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educators under comprehensive accountability systems.
 Potential negative unintended consequences from high stakes testing, incentives,
or local flexibility can be mitigated by school governance changes such as school
councils and school choice.
Agenda for Policy Research
 As noted by Hanushek (1995) and Hannaway (1996), how well students learn
under comprehensive accountability systems coupled with local flexibility will
determine the success of this, and any, education reform. In particular, a system of
incentives and/or local flexibility may cause unintended harm to student learning by
focusing too much attention on what is easily measurable and/or allowing autonomy to
be misused without responsibility. Therefore, education research must increase efforts to
evaluate the effects of these reforms on student learning. In addition, given that the basis
for increasing local flexibility is premised on accurate measurement of student outcomes
and significant incentives through rewards and interventions, education research must
also analyze the extent to which measurement of student outcomes is accurate and
incentives are meaningful. Without these conditions present, states and the federal
government should be wary of going down the path, despite its promise, of increased
flexibility for local educators.
Notes
1Scafidi and DeJarnett served on the staff of GERSC in 1999 and 2000, and Freeman
served on the GERSC staff in 2000.
2
 The full text of this speech is available on-line at
http://ganet.org/governor/edreform/speech.html
3The other three committees were:
Funding: which studied ways to increase equity of school funding across the state.
School Climate: which, in the wake of the Columbine (Colorado) and Heritage High
(Georgia) violence, studied ways to make schools safer.
Seamless Education: which studied ways to make the transitions from k-12 to technical
colleges, and k-12 to two-year colleges easier.
4None of the accountability members were officials in teachers' unions or professional
organizations or any of the other professional organizations for educators (school board,
school superintendents, etc.).
5For example, Georgia State University Professor Gary Henry made several
presentations to the accountability committee very early in the process. Previously, he
served as an education official in Virginia and consulted with the state of North Carolina
when they set up a testing and accountability system. Gwinnett County (GA) School
Superintendent Alvin Wilbanks, who instituted high stakes testing in his district's
schools, served as a Committee member as well. These individuals, as well as education
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officials from Texas and North Carolina who also made presentations to the
accountability committee, seemed to support very strongly the "Standards and
Expectations" recommendation of the 1983 "A Nation at Risk" report, which called for
"rigorous and measurable standards, and higher expectations, for academic performance
and student conduct."
6Many states that have implemented accountability systems such as Georgia's have
rewards and interventions. For example, Kentucky and North Carolina give bonuses to
teachers at schools deemed successful (based on their students' outcomes). Florida
allows students at schools deemed failing to transfer to other public schools in the
district, at the district's expense and offers them a modest scholarship to attend a private
school (the private school portion of thes school choice option is currently under
litigation).
7Georgia Official Code 20-14-14
8Georgia Official Code 12-14-41
9Examples of these consequences around the nation include cash bonuses to teachers in
schools deemed successful in Kentucky and North Carolina and public school choice for
students in schools deemed persistently failing in Florida. For schools deemed failing,
many states have reconstitution and removal of school personnel at the behest of the
state, but these provisions are rarely implemented. Failure to utilize interventions leads
to an elimination of any motivational benefits that come from having consequences.
10Helen Ladd has wondered, "whether the undesirable side effects of accountability and
incentive systems can be kept to a tolerable level (Ladd, 1996)." Issues surrounding
standards and accountability include the accuracy and quality of curriculum-based
exams, whether such exams and incentives in general cause too many unintended
consequences that harm teaching and learning, and whether all children benefit from
these exams and from comprehensive accountability systems. Good references on these
debates over accountability and the validity of high stakes testing include, Behn (1997),
Betts (1998), Hannaway (996), Kohn (1999), Ladd (1999), Koretz, et al (1996),
Grissmer, et al (2000), Klein, et al (2000), and the contents of the volumes Holding 
Schools Accountable (1996), edited by Ladd, and Improving America's Schools: The 
Role of Incentives, edited by Hanushek and Jorgensen.
11Thus, federal government efforts to provide local educators more flexibility over
federal taxpayer resources could be made contingent upon the existence of
comprehensive state-level accountability systems.
12While working for GERSC, we heard several Georgia state employees suggest that it
was "impossible" to have local flexibility and accountability at the same time. Their
comments suggest that the culture of state monitoring of local inputs, process, and
program implementation is alive and well--despite the passage of a results-based
comprehensive accountability system the previous year. Examples of "accountability"
for inputs, processes, and implementation include state regulations on maximum class
size, state prescribed curricular programs, and teacher salary schedules. For each of these
examples, many states hold local educators "accountable" for adhering to and
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implementing these state mandates. These examples are in contrast to states holding
local educators accountable for results--student learning outcomes.
13Surely college professors would love to avoid annual reviews of their research
productivity, student evaluations of their teaching, and deans watching the number of
students signing up for their courses and the national rankings of their departments. Each
of these output measures is used to determine annual pay increases. In the absence of
these measures of productivity, strong rules and regulations would be needed to govern
professors' activities. Similar analogies can be made for all occupations, inside and
outside of education.
14Chicago public schools have school councils that have real power--each school
council hires its school's principal. See Bryk, et al (1998) for more details of the school
governance structure in Chicago. Given the vast differences in authority, it is likely that
the impact of Georgia's school councils will be much smaller, under existing legislation,
relative to the Chicago experience.
15Under a school choice regime principals and teachers would be the local educators
who directly make educational decisions, while parents vote to give local educators
power to make decisions for their children through their school choice decisions.
16Hannaway (1996) suggests that local educators who are given, for the first time, a
large degree of autonomy need training in "the range of production possibilities in
education" as well. If empowered to make changes, held sufficiently responsible for their
decisions, and skilled in management, local educators will take it upon themselves to
discover and create "possibilities in education."
17In its 2000 education reform law, Georgia began to enforce decreased maximum class
sizes.
18The Massachusetts Institute for New Teachers (MINT) is such a state program. MINT
recruits college graduates to enter its summer program. MINT students teach summer
school in the morning and take teacher preparation courses in the evening. Individual
public schools in Massachusetts are permitted to hire MINT graduates and grant them
full certification. By expanding the pool of available teachers, the state has given local
educators more flexibility over personnel (Scafidi, 2000).
19Interview with Texas education official Dr. Criss Cloudt and documents from the
Florida Department of Education and Florida Senate Bill 1770.
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